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INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY LAWt
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AND
THE COUNTY SHERIFF
Daniel R. Cowans*
The existence of the bankruptcy remedy in the federal courts
poses some problems for sheriffs and their legal advisers growing
out of attachment, execution and garnishment which the sheriff
has levied or which some creditor insists be levied in spite of bank-
ruptcy. It will be assumed that the sheriff has no other connection
with property of the debtor-bankrupt than under such levies.
Briefly, but probably not exhaustively, the sheriff's primary ques-
tions are:
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FILING OF A BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDING?
In bankruptcy a debtor takes advantage of a federal law which
enables him to seek relief from further actions of his creditors.
In other words he seeks a discharge. Depending upon his conduct,
he may or may not be granted one.' But regardless of the decision
as to his discharge, the debtor must surrender most or in some cases
all of his property for the benefit of his creditors.2 This is true
whether the bankruptcy was voluntarily filed by the debtor or filed
against him by his creditors. The device used by Congress to ad-
minister the property is to select a representative of all the creditors,
namely a trustee in bankruptcy, who takes legal title to property of
the bankrupt as of the date of bankruptcy. The trustee is not
actually selected until a few weeks after bankruptcy, but upon
t The first three articles in the Institute were originally prepared for presentation
at the Mid-Winter Civil Law Conference for the District Attorneys and County
Counsels of California, held at the University of Santa Clara School of Law early this
year.
* A.B., 1943, LL.B., 1950, University of California. Member, California Bar.
Referee in Bankruptcy, United States District Court; Associate Professor, School of
Law, University of Santa Clara.
1 The grounds of objection to discharge are found in BANKRUPTCY ACT § 14, 11
U.S.C. § 32.
2 On property which passes from the bankrupt to his trustee, see BANKRUPTCY
ACT § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a). Section 70(a) excludes exempt property and section
6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 adopts state laws on exemptions.
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his selection his title relates back to the date of filing. Should the
situation require it a temporary trustee, called a receiver, may be
appointed. The receiver takes no title, but he has the right and
responsibility to take action to collect and preserve property.'
A few brief rules as to property to which the trustee takes
title are important.
1. It is the bankrupt's title as of the date of bankruptcy which
passes to the trustee.4
2. The exceptions to this are:
a. Property inherited within six months of bankruptcy
filing.
b. Non-transferrable property interests which become
transferrable within six months of bankruptcy filing,
e.g., a contingent remainder which vests within that time.
c. Property in tenancy by the entireties which becomes
vested within six months.
d. Any property not covered by the provisions of section
70(a).
3. The trustee does not take title to property of the bankrupt
which is exempt under state or federal law, but it passes to him
for administration, which means he has a possessory right to exam-
ine and appraise it.'
4. Community property of the parties passes to the trustee of
the husband even though the wife does not file in bankruptcy.'
Thus the bankrupt upon filing no longer has title. Any levies
sought by the creditor upon property which passed to the trustee
may be refused by the sheriff without incurring liability.' Even
though the sheriff may have property under levy at the time of
filing, it may be noted that the last sentence of section 70(a) of the
act says that the title of the trustee shall not be affected by the
prior possession of a receiver or other officer of any court. Recalling
that a levy prior to any sale does not give the creditor title to the
property, but only a lien, it is obvious that the trustee takes his
title to property held under levy subject to this lien unless there
is some defect in the lien because of either state law or some invali-
dating provision of the Bankruptcy Act.
3 BANKRUPTCY ACT § 2(a)3, 11 U.S.C. § lI(a)3.
4 BANKRUPTCY ACT § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a).
5 Vought v. Kanne, 10 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1926).
6 Hannah v. Swift, 61 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1932); Gibbons v. Goldsmith, 22 Fed.
826 (9th Cir. 1915); Holahan v. Misuraca, 112 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. La. 1953).
7 Hunydee v. Strand, 214 Cal. App. 2d 647, 29 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1963).
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The limitation of the trustee's title to property of the bankrupt
means that after-acquired property of the bankrupt (with the rare
exceptions previously stated) is not affected by bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Once a bankruptcy is filed, further levies upon property
of the bankrupt which passed to the trustee are improper, but
levies upon after-acquired property of the bankrupt are quite proper
unless a court of competent jurisdiction restrains them. Indicative
of the latter point is section 17 of the act which provides that even
though a discharge is granted, certain debts may still be collected.
It is clear that it is improper to take the position, as some do, that
bankruptcy automatically stops everything in relation to the debtor
who becomes a bankrupt.
WHAT KNOWLEDGE OR NOTICE Is REQUIRED To AFFECT THE
ACTIONS OF A SHERIFF?
A sheriff incurs no liability and does no legal wrong by execut-
ing writs after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, but before he
knows of it."
It appears that the sheriff has no duty to search the records
of bankruptcy filings every time he levies. On the other hand, if
the sheriff is served with papers which the Bankruptcy Act makes
sufficient proof of bankruptcy, he could not be heard to say he did
not know of it. Section 21(e) of the act makes a certified copy of
the order approving the bond of the trustee "conclusive evidence"
of his appointment and qualification. In between is a shadow area
in which the sheriff's knowledge of the bankruptcy may come
about by accidental reading, anonymous telephone calls, or being
advised by the attorney for the bankrupt or trustee. It has been
held that the filing of the petition in bankruptcy is itself sufficient
to prevent a sale thereafter, if the filing is brought to the attention
of the sheriff before the sale is completed. The method of notice
in the case was the delivery of an invalid restraining order.' But a
sheriff was held not liable for conversion in selling after bankruptcy
where advised by telephone that a bankruptcy was to be filed. The
court observed that if the sheriff had refrained from selling and the
bankruptcy were never filed, the sheriff would be guilty of contempt
of court in failing to execute the writ.' In the same case the court
8 Conner v. Long, 104 U.S. 228 (1881).
9 In re Miles Paint Mfg. Co., 32 Am. Bankr. R. 793 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
10 Coppard v. Gardner, 199 S.W. 650 (Tex. 1917). In California, Laubisch v.
Roberdo, 43 Cal. 2d 702, 277 P.2d 9 (1954) is cited as authority that process is required
to obtain action by the sheriff. Aside from the fact that the case did not deal with
bankruptcy, it seems that although it may stand for the point that process directed
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said that notice of the filing of the bankruptcy "must come through
official channels and can be of no efficacy when issued by a citizen
clothed with no authority." If this imports that the sheriff must be
served with valid process or that a restraining order is required
to bar further levies, it is of questionable validity and inconsistent
with the previously cited federal case on the service of the invalid
restraining order. If, on the other hand, it means that some credible
documentary proof that a bankruptcy has been filed for or against
the debtor is required, it seems sound.
WHEN MUST A SHERIFF TURN OVER MONEY OR ASSETS WHICH
HE HAS UNDER LEVY TO THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY?
The discussion at this point relates to assets which, as between
bankrupt and trustee, pass to the trustee. The problem of when
the sheriff releases after-acquired assets to the bankrupt or levying
creditor will be considered below.
The bankruptcy power of the federal system is constitutional,
and Congress has the paramount power to confer on the federal
bankruptcy court complete jurisdiction to handle all bankruptcy
problems." But it has not done so, and the resultant confusion and
uncertainty over jurisdictional problems makes it questionable
whether the reticence of Congress is wise. In the divided jurisdic-
tion some matters relating to bankruptcy are to be handled by state
courts only, some by that part of the United States district court
presided over by the district judge, some by that part of the district
court presided over by the referee in bankruptcy, while in some
cases there may be concurrent jurisdiction. As a working premise
one may say there is plenary jurisdiction in proceedings before the
state court or the district judge and summary jurisdiction in matters
handled by the referee. The primary difference is that summary
jurisdiction brings matters on for hearing much more quickly by
means of an application and order to show cause, while plenary
jurisdiction requires the slower complaint, answer, discovery pro-
cedure, setting procedure, and pre-trial conference.
As a general proposition comity between courts is observed,
and the first court to take jurisdiction will have the ultimate task
of deciding a matter. In some instances the bankruptcy court will
take over a matter pending in the state court. The key to exclusive
summary jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court is possession of prop-
to the sheriff is necessary to get him to act, it does not stand for the proposition that
process is necessary to have him refrain from executing a levy.
11 Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924).
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erty by the bankrupt or by one who does not hold adversely to
him on the date of bankruptcy. The United States Supreme Court
has held that the possession of a sheriff is the possession of the
state court and that if there is no statutory grant of summary juris-
diction, the bankruptcy court (i.e., the referee) may not take the
property from the sheriff and state court by means of a turnover
order requiring delivery to the trustee. 2
Subsequent to this decision Congress gave a very important
grant of summary jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court. The concept
of what is now section 67(a) of the act has long been in the law.
The policy of equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among
his creditors requires invalidation of certain pre-bankruptcy trans-
actions. Among them is the nullification of attachment and execu-
tion liens obtained within four months of bankruptcy while the
bankrupt was insolvent. While this is an old concept, it was only
after the previously cited case that section 67(a)4 was added giv-
ing summary jurisdiction to the referee to handle lien invalidation
under this section. So although the state court may have possession
of property through levies by its sheriff, this is one instance of
federal jurisdiction superseding state jurisdiction. Under California
law the sheriff need not decide at his peril if a court order regular
on its face was validly issued,"8 and this is almost certainly the
law in relation to orders of the bankruptcy court.
As section 67(a) purports to invalidate only levies obtained
within four months of filing, the question arises as to levies made
prior to that time. There are old decisions of lower federal courts
which hold that it is proper to restrain sales by sheriffs upon exe-
cutions levied more than four months before bankruptcy. 4 The
rationale of the cases is that though the liens are not invalidated
under section 67, nevertheless the property passes to the trustee
and he may not destroy or disregard that lien, but is subject to it.
These cases have been thoroughly discredited by later decisions of
the Supreme Court. 5 As a practical matter experienced attorneys
for trustees will not make a demand for assets levied upon more
than four months before bankruptcy "a
12 Ibid.
18 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 262.1.
14 In re Vastbinder, 132 Fed. 718 (M.D. Pa. 1904); In re Baughman, 138 Fed.
742 (M.D. Pa. 1905).
15 Stratton v. New, 238 U.S. 318 (1931); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller v. Fox, 264
U.S. 426 (1924).
1a Since this paper was originally presented a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Rialto Publishing Co. v. Bass, 325 F.2d 527 (1963) was
published. An attachment was levied when the creditor did not have reasonable cause
to believe the debtor insolvent and judgments were obtained and executions levied
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If the writ produces property subject to sale and the sale has
taken place but the proceeds not delivered to the levying creditor,
the money goes to the trustee if the levy was within four months.'"
Granting, then, that the bankruptcy court has summary jurisdic-
tion of actions to invalidate levies within four months, when should
the sheriff actually turn the money over to the trustee? If in a suit
between private parties in the state court there is a dispute about
the validity of a levy, the sheriff would not turn the property in
question over to one of the parties pending decision of the court
unless the necessary bonds were put up to release the property from
attachment. The sheriff would await the decision of the court.
The situation in the bankruptcy court where there is a receiver
or trustee is not comparable. This person is not a private party
but an officer of the court and is under bond to the court for the
faithful performance of his duties. In private litigation there may
be the fear that a private party would sell or dispose of the asset
in question before the matter is settled and then turn out to be
financially unable to account for its value. In bankruptcy the re-
receiver or trustee may make no dispotion of the asset without the
order of the court having jurisdiction. Thus the danger in turning
an asset over to a trustee, pending decision of the bankruptcy court
as to the validity of the levy, is minimal or non-existent.
If the receiver or trustee brings proceedings in the bankruptcy
court to invalidate the lien of the levy and the levying creditor is
named and served, I consider it proper for the sheriff to release
the property to the trustee or receiver upon being served with a
copy of the papers. The existence of summary jurisdiction is, of
course, no guarantee that the lien of the levy will be invalidated.
Should the trustee be unsuccessful, the property will be returned
to the sheriff by the order of the referee. Because there is a possi-
bility of an unnecessary handing back and forth of assets, many
experienced trustee's attorneys will be perfectly content with the
assurance of-the sheriff that he will hold the property pending re-
ceipt of the order of the court. If there are perishables or a business
involving substantial rental expense, the receiver or trustee will
wish to move promptly and may desire to take physical possession
of the property. In any case the trustee should be given physical
access to take inventory and appraise the property.
when the creditor did have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. In
holding there was a preference under section 60 of the Act the court declined to
recognize the attachment as of sufficient weight to comprise a lien for the purposes
of section 60. If a similar view is taken of attachments under section 67(a) then
attachments more than four months before bankruptcy may no longer be immune.
16 Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U.S. 486 (1903).
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It should be clear that not all levies prior to bankruptcy are
invalidated upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Thus physical
release does not appear to be required if no proceedings are com-
menced to invalidate the lien of the levy, if there is no allegation
that the levy was within four months of bankruptcy, or if the levy-
ing creditor is not named and served.
A practical consideration arises from the fact that the majority
of levies are upon wages and are in such comparatively small
amounts that extensive legal proceedings are not justified. In most
of these the creditor will not answer or appear to contest any
proceedings to invalidate his levy. A simple and inexpensive pro-
cedure to turn over this money to the trustee would be desireable.
In some counties sheriffs will turn the money over to trustees with
nothing more than the proof of their appointment. However, a
sheriff who refuses to release the money without proof of the com-
mencement of proceedings is within his legal rights.
Should the sheriff be in doubt about the propriety of making
or refraining from further levies or of turning over the money to
the trustee, there is a simple and swift procedure available, if a
receiver or trustee has been appointed. He can file an application
with the referee and serve both the levying creditor and the trustee
or receiver. Such an application should contain the advice that the
sheriff has been given a writ to levy upon property of the named
person, a bankruptcy has been filed as to that person, there is a dis-
pute between the levying creditor and the estate of the bankrupt
as to the title to and liens upon the property, and applicant prays
that a determination be made as to the title or right of possession
of the property or both. If the matter arises in the interval between
filing and appointment of a trustee or receiver, a request may be
added that a receiver be appointed to represent the creditors and
that applicant be permitted to bring such receiver in as a party to
the proceedings. In the normal course the matter is heard within a
few days, and so no claim of great harm from the delay is likely
to be valid. As a note of extra caution a motion might be made in
the state court proceedings for leave to file the application.
Theoretically, there may be nothing wrong with asking the
state court to determine that no further levies should be made until
the matter is settled by the bankruptcy court, but experience shows
that state courts tend to regard such a question as properly before
the bankruptcy court. All this procedure is, of course, something
that would be likely to be used only in a very large case. Seldom
will a bankrupt have property of such value as to make these
precautions very important.
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WHEN IS A SHERIFF JUSTIFIED IN REFRAINING, OR REQUIRED
To REFRAIN, FROM FURTHER LEVIES?
This question has been partially answered. Unless he has some
proper notification of an actual filing of bankruptcy or the lien
which results from the levy predates bankruptcy by more than
four months, he should not disregard his customary duties. But all
this relates to levies on property passing to the trustee. After-
acquired property which does not pass to the trustee belongs to
the bankrupt subject to the rights of certain creditors to resort to
it with levies. Creditors whose claims arise after bankruptcy are
not impeded by the proceedings, and there is no basis for refusal to
execute writs obtained in aid of their collection. As to creditors of
debts existing before the bankruptcy filing, there are several prob-
lems. Section 17 of the act designates certain types of debts which
survive a bankruptcy discharge. These creditors may levy, although
there may be litigation to determine whether a particular debt is
within these classes. Furthermore, if the bankrupt's discharge has
been denied, all of his old creditors may levy. If the bankrupt
waives his discharge as to otherwise discharged debts by making
a new promise or otherwise, these creditors are free to pursue him.
To impose upon the sheriff the burden of examining each claim
for its exact status in relation to discharge is improper. The grant-
ing of a bankruptcy discharge unfortunately makes no decision
or adjudication as to the effect of bankruptcy on particular debts.
It merely arms the bankrupt with a defense similar to such defenses
as the Statute of Frauds or the statute of limitations. It is up to
the bankrupt to provide his own protection by making the proper
use of this defense. To aid him bankruptcy law provides two types
of restraining orders.
1. Temporary Restraining Orders
Although the bankruptcy discharge is a defense similar to such
defenses as Statute of Frauds or statute of limitations, there is an
important difference. These latter defenses must be based upon
facts which exist at the date of the filing of the complaint, or else
they may not be used. The bankruptcy discharge defense may not
exist because it has not been granted when the complaint was filed.
The discharge is not even granted at the time the bankruptcy is
filed; it comes later in the proceedings, although it relates back
to the date of bankruptcy. It is not proper to plead to a state court
complaint that a discharge will be obtained in the future in a bank-
ruptcy that has been or will be filed, because there is no guarantee
that the bankrupt will be given a discharge.
1964]
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To solve this problem and let the bankrupt avail himself of a
discharge if he receives one, the act authorizes a restraining order
against continued prosecution of suits pending at the time of bank-
ruptcy filing, if the debt is one which would be discharged. 7 Al-
though there is no specific statutory authorization, most referees
will grant the restraint as to suits commenced after bankruptcy
but before the discharge is rendered. It is up to the bankrupt to
persuade the referee that the debt in question is dischargeable. If
the referee makes the order, I think the sheriff need not pay heed
to a creditor's argument that the debt is not a dischargeable one.
There are regular appellate channels to raise that argument.
There has grown up a practice on the part of some referees
in California and elsewhere which somewhat troubles me. It is good
practical administration but of questionable legal validity. I refer
to the practice of granting these restraining orders ex parte in
chambers with no prior notice to the creditor or opportunity to be
heard. In a number of cases the order provides that if the creditor
desires to be heard in reference to setting aside such an order, he
may appear by filing an application to set aside the order, serve
it and then appear. In the interim, however, it is an order of court,
and a creditor may be harmed because the sheriff refuses to make
levies on account of the order. I am not sure that this complies
with the due process requirements of fair notice and an opportunity
to be heard.'" I do not believe that a sheriff is in contempt of the
bankruptcy court in levying on after-acquired property of the
debtor if he has been served with such an ex parte restraining
order. Let me, however, draw a distinction. If one commences what
I consider proper procedure in these matters by filing an applica-
tion for the order together with an order to show cause seeking to
get the restraining order after hearing upon notice, a provision
restraining proceedings until such time as the matter can be heard
is proper. I think it would be contempt to disregard that. The differ-
ence is whether the papers served show that a hearing is con-
templated. If they do not, I would question their validity.
Aside from the question of contempt, there is the question of
liability of the sheriff to the bankrupt if the levy is wrongful, or to
17 BANKRUPTCY ACT § 1l(a), 11 U.S.C. § 29(a).
18 Possibly relevant and indicative of the attitude of Congress and the Supreme
Court are General Order 23 and section 314 of the act which is a part of Chapter XI.
The General Order provides that in all orders made by a referee, it shall be recited
as the fact may be, that notice was given and the manner thereof or that the order
was made by consent or that no adverse interest was represented at the hearing or
that the order was made after hearing adverse interests. Section 314 authorizes restrain-
ing orders "upon notice" against the commencement or continuation of any proceeding
to enforce any lien upon property of the debtor.
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the creditor if the refusal to levy is wrongful. I previously cited
the case of no liability to a creditor for refusal to levy after service
of an invalid restraining order in the case of levy on property pass-
ing to the trustee. Possibly the result would be the same in the
matter of after-acquired property. It may be more difficult to defend
the making of a levy under writ where the restraining order is
invalid than it is to defend the refusal to levy.
Since these restraining orders are by the terms of section 11 (a)
of the act only temporary, any order which purports to last beyond
the final ruling on the discharge is beyond the power granted by
Congress. It would at least be invalid as to the excess time, but it
would probably not be considered totally invalid.
2. Permanent Restraining Orders
The second type of restraint available in the bankruptcy court
is a permanent restraining order. There is no duplication or over-
lapping because section 11(a) orders are available only before the
discharge is granted and can last only until discharge, while the
second type is available only after discharge. The latter is non-
statutory but was clearly enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court.'9 The Court found that a bankruptcy court, like any other
court, has jurisdiction to enforce its own orders, that the discharge
was such an order, and that there was jurisdiction to grant a per-
manent restraining order. There were some problems as to qualifi-
cation for these, but I think the sheriff need not be concerned if
the order recites service upon the creditor.
Must the sheriff be personally named as a respondent in these
restraining order proceedings? I have previously taken the position
that for proper protection of the bankrupt the sheriff should be
named.2" I do not retreat from that position, but from the point
of view of the sheriff one must consider an old decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.21 The sheriff was held liable to a debtor for
damages resulting from a sale after being served with a restraining
order in which he was not named. The court raised but did not
answer the question of whether the sheriff was a necessary party.
It observed that in any event he would merely be a formal party
and his absence was not fatal to the action against him for dam-
ages. The restraining order in the case was not issued out of a
bankruptcy court, but this would seem to make no difference. I do
not consider that the sheriff incurs any liability for contempt of
19 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
20 COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 506 (1963).
21 Buffandeau v. Edmondson, 17 Cal. 436 (1861).
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the bankruptcy court for levying, if he is not named in the order.
But, once again, the civil liability picture may not be consistent
with the contempt matters.
Akin to the problem of turning over money held on pre-bank-
ruptcy levies to the trustee or the creditor is the problem of the
release by the sheriff of any monies obtained on levies before
restraining order proceedings were determined. The restraining
order procedure under section 11(a) of the act does not purport to
determine who is entitled to the money, but only to preserve the
status quo until final ruling on the discharge. Therefore, the grant-
ing of this type of restraining order does not mean that the cred-
itor may not eventually become entitled to the money. It would be
improper to release it to the bankrupt at this point. A subsequent
decision of the state court will decide who is entitled to it. Cor-
respondingly, the refusal of the bankruptcy court to grant this
restraining order does not mean that the creditor in attachment is
irrevocably entitled to it. He may, for example, not be able to
establish his cause of action. The refusal to grant the order means
only that bankruptcy discharge will not be a successful defense to
the action. If the writ is execution and not attachment, the refusal
to restrain removes the possibility that a bankruptcy discharge
may be used as a basis of an attempt to quash or recall the writ.
Thus release after decision on the section 11(a) restraining order is
not indicated.
In the permanent restraining order proceedings after dis-
charge, the granting of an order permanently prohibits the creditor
from taking any action and justifies release of anything held to
the bankrupt. The provision for release may well be included in
the order, but release is proper even if it is not included. If a per-
manent restraining order is denied, the matter is then to be treated
as if there were no bankruptcy court to consider. Any further re-
lief to the bankrupt must come from the state court. If the de-
nial in the bankruptcy court was on the merits or it was refused
because a state court had previously ruled the debt to be non-
dischargeable, then no further relief will be forthcoming from the
state court, and the sheriff would have to proceed with his levy
procedure. If denial in the bankruptcy court was because the bank-
ruptcy court did not consider the matter to meet the requirements
under the Supreme Court views in Local Loan, then the bankrupt's
only recourse is to the state court. The sheriff then would proceed
as ordered by the state court.
There is authority to the effect that fairness to all parties
requires that, pending decision on whether restraining order or a
discharge will be granted, any temporary restraint should be limited.
[Vol. 4
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That is, the sheriff may go on collecting the property of the debtor,
but may not disburse it to the creditor until the decision is final.22
This is not the most common practice. In any event, from the
sheriff's point of view the matter is simple. He must read the order.
If he is restrained from taking further action, he should neither
collect nor disburse. If he is merely restrained from disbursing
without further order of the court, he has not been restrained from
collecting under the levy.
Finally, a note about sheriff's fees. In many counties the sheriff
will not extend credit and requires deposits by levying creditors
against his fees. There is no bankruptcy problem here. In other
counties if the sheriff has a claim not covered by a deposit, it has
been held that he has no right to retain possession of property
under attachment for his fees because the bankruptcy court will
protect his fee claiins.13 Fees for services rendered after filing of
the petition in bankruptcy which had the effect of preserving the
estate will be considered an expense of administration claim and
thus be entitled to share as a claim of the highest class of priority.
24
If state law gives a lien for the fees, the lien will not be invalidated
by bankruptcy.
22 In re Parkening, 145 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1944); In re Vollweiler, 52 F. Supp.
347 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); In re Brecher, 19 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
23 In re Francis-Valentine, 94 Fed. 793 (9th Cir. 1899).
24 BANxRUPTCY ACT § 64(a)1, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)1.
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